Abstract A detailed review of drinking water disease outbreaks over the past 30 years in 15 affluent countries produced over 70 case studies, some involving fatalities, which revealed a number of common factors in these disasters. Some of these outbreaks involved off-flavours, either as a driver for reducing disinfection and making the system vulnerable to pathogenic contamination or as an early warning of contamination that was not responded to with sufficient urgency or efficiency to avoid a disease outbreak. The characteristics of these outbreaks are recounted and the important link they reveal between aesthetically pleasing drinking water and safety is documented. Our analysis of common features in drinking water outbreaks also supports an argument that the failure of a water utility to be concerned about aesthetic factors makes such water supplies an inherently greater health risk for their consumers.
Introduction
In May 2000, contamination of the drinking water supply of Walkerton, a community of about 4,800 in Ontario, Canada's richest province, caused seven deaths, 27 cases of haemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS), a serious and potentially fatal kidney ailment, 65 hospitalizations and more than 2,300 cases of gastroenteritis. Disease was caused by the enteric pathogens Escherichia coli O157:H7 and by various species of Campylobacter. This tragedy sent shock waves through the Canadian drinking water community and led to a broad-based public inquiry led by Justice Dennis O'Connor to determine the causes and responsibility for this tragedy (O'Connor, 2002a) and to examine broader questions relating to the safety of drinking water in Ontario (O'Connor, 2002b) . The senior author of this paper served on the Research Advisory Panel to the Inquiry leading to an investigation of other drinking water outbreaks in affluent countries over the past 30 years. This work formed the foundation for our collection of over 70 case studies of drinking water disease outbreaks (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004) . At least 10 of these case studies involved aesthetic factors including off-flavours in some way or another. These particular case studies are explored to evaluate some of the linkages between off-flavours and drinking water safety.
More than 10 years ago, Michael McGuire (McGuire Environmental Consultants) addressed the 4th International Symposium on Off-Flavours in the Aquatic Environment stressing the importance of off-flavours as the consumer's measure of drinking water safety (McGuire, 1995) . He stated: "If consumers detect an off-flavour in their drinking water, they are likely to believe that it is not safe. Water utilities will be defeating their best efforts to provide safe drinking water if they only meet health-related regulations and do not provide water that is free of off-flavour problems…Utilities should adopt a water quality goal that allows them to not only meet the minimums of the regulations, but also meet the customer's highest standards -water that is free of off-flavours." Because the explosive and continuing growth in bottled water sales in North America over the past decade has resulted in a loss of market share that water utilities have largely allowed to happen without any coordinated or substantive response, McGuire's message remains highly relevant today. To reinforce the obvious, our case studies will show that aesthetic factors can have a vital direct link to drinking water safety. As such, no water utility can afford to ignore the aesthetic quality of its water, as perceived by their consumers, if it is committed to providing safe drinking water.
Materials and methods
In assembling data for our book (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004 ), we analysed the major factors contributing to drinking water disease outbreaks by searching the published English language literature over the past 30 years together with targeted gathering of inquiry and health department reports of selected major outbreaks. We screened published papers for those that discussed specific disease outbreaks and which described some of the failure modes contributing to those outbreaks. There was substantial variation in the quality and detail of description for failure mechanisms among the papers that we retrieved. For this paper, we have selected case studies that involved some element of off-flavours in the story surrounding the outbreak.
Results and discussion
Outbreaks without apparent sensory warning despite massive contamination Unfortunately, the large majority of outbreak case studies we analysed provided no evidence of opportunities for consumers to protect themselves by means of sensory detection of contamination. In one extreme case, involving , 3,600 cases of giardiasis at Sälen, a Swedish ski resort, consumers were apparently exposed to drinking water that became extremely contaminated from a blocked sewer over a period of three weeks (Andersson and de Jong, 1989) . Exposed consumers experienced attack rates ranging from 88% in the first week to 95% in the second and 91% in the third week. Water samples collected from the distribution system confirmed that the water was heavily contaminated with sewage, and Giardia lamblia cysts were recovered from the distribution system. Isolation of pathogens from the water supply is often not possible in outbreak investigations further suggesting that this episode involved heavy contamination. Such high attack rates also suggest contamination levels that should have been accompanied by other signs of contamination, including odour and taste, but the published report of this outbreak makes no mention of any aesthetic complaints (Andersson and de Jong, 1989) .
Another outbreak caused over 2,200 cases of gastroenteritis in La Neuveville, Swizerland, with a very high attack rate: 84% in the community and 95% among children aged zero to seven (Hafliger et al., 2000; Maurer and Sturchler, 2000) . In this case, a sewage pump failed allowing sewage to contaminate the well supplying water to the community. The alarm, which should have warned of this problem, had been disarmed years earlier because technical problems had been causing false alarms. Monitoring results confirmed very heavy contamination showing E. coli results above 10,000/100 mL in the distributed water. This outbreak followed an earlier outbreak about 10 months previously. The role of drinking water in causing the earlier outbreak was disputed by town officials who were reluctant to cancel an upcoming wine festival despite the high level of illness in the community and the obvious threat to tourist visitors. In the earlier outbreak, some residents had complained about visible impurities but no details of these complaints were provided.
Clearly, consumers cannot be expected to detect health-threatening contamination on the basis of taste or odour, meaning there is an obligation on drinking water providers to maintain adequate safety barriers, including effective process monitoring to assure the safety of the water they deliver. Yet, there are some case studies where aesthetic factors provided clear warnings to consumers which were unfortunately not acted upon by the water provider.
Outbreaks with sensory warning A number of outbreak case studies involved sensory warnings that may not have been directly tied to the contamination leading to the outbreak but which were indicative of related water quality problems whose resolution may well have reduced the vulnerability of the water supply to health-threatening contamination. In the case of Bradford, Pennsylvania, an unfiltered, chlorinated water supply to ,18,000 people caused a giardiasis outbreak in 1979 infecting an estimated 2,900-3,500 consumers (Lippy, 1981) . In this case, episodes of high turbidity (NTU) and colour in July and August clearly demonstrated the inadequacy of the water treatment without filtration (Akin and Jakubowski, 1986) . Ironically, Bradford applied for and was granted a waiver from the US. EPA requirement to notify consumers about the excessive turbidity values, reflecting the misunderstanding of that time about the importance of turbidity as a critical indicator of particle removal for assuring protection against protozoan pathogens such as Giardia, which required maximum chlorine disinfection efficiency.
An example of recurring taste and odour problems, which went largely unresolved until the mid-1980s, occurred in Edmonton, Alberta. Although there were multiple factors contributing to Edmonton's recurring taste and odour problems, a major factor at that time was hydrocarbon contamination of the urban runoff discharged through storm sewers located upstream of the intake for the Rossdale Water Treatment plant (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004) . Over the period from October 1982 to June 1983, Edmonton experienced one of the largest waterborne Giardia outbreaks ever reported. Acceptance that this was a waterborne outbreak was slow in coming, despite a compelling combination of epidemiological and circumstantial evidence. The Edmonton Board of Health conducted the epidemiological investigation based on 895 cases of laboratory-confirmed giardiasis (King-Collier and Macdonald, 1983) . The clustering of cases around the Rossdale water treatment plant compared with the Smith treatment plant located upstream of any storm outfalls was particularly telling (Figure 1) .
Although there were consistent denials that the drinking water was responsible for the giardiasis outbreak, the waterborne cause was strongly implicated after the Rossdale plant was evaluated by US EPA outbreak specialist, Edwin Lippy, who concluded: "…it is my professional opinion that under challenge, the plant could not respond to effectively remove or inactivate giardia cysts". All that was necessary to attribute the outbreak to contaminated water from the Rossdale water treatment plant was the Giardia challenge referred to by Lippy. The Rossdale intake was located downstream from 85 storm sewer outfalls, the closest being a 1.7 m diamenter sewer approximately 3 km upstream which was estimated to have about 1% of its flow as sanitary sewage (Figure 2 ).
Based on a dye study of dilution of contaminants from this upstream sewer in the river flow by the time it reached the Rossdale intake and an estimated Giardia cyst concentration of 15 million/g (Lippy, 1978) , a typical stool mass of 150 g fully dispersed in the storm sewer would have produced a cyst concentration in the Rossdale intake of between 1,800 and 3,200/100 L, more than sufficient to cause a substantial challenge to the inadequate capability of this treatment plant as it was configured in 1983 (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004) . If the recurring taste and odour problem caused by discharges from the storm sewers had been investigated and this contamination problem resolved it seems plausible that the vulnerability of this water supply to contamination by pathogens could have been recognised and dealt with before this outbreak occurred.
Ironically, in one case, taste and odour complaints apparently precipitated remedial actions that resulted in a fatal outbreak. In November and December of 1993, an outbreak of gastroenteritis affected an estimated 650 consumers in Gideon, Missouri, a town of approximately 1,100 (Clark et al., 1996; Angulo et al., 1997) . Ultimately, seven deaths were attributed to infection by Salmonella typhimirium in this outbreak. The investigation of this outbreak was hampered by the late recognition that it was occurring, five weeks after the first cases. The system, which provided untreated groundwater, was flushed systematically on 10 November in response to taste and odour complaints from consumers. The first cases of illness began to appear within two days. The actual cause of contamination was never determined unambiguously, but the most likely cause was contamination, either from a private storage tank or a municipal storage tank, both of which had apparently been contaminated by bird faeces. The pathogen responsible for the serious illness, a specific strain of S. typhimirium, was isolated from sediments in the private storage tank, but there was contradictory evidence about whether the back flow prevention valve on this private connection was properly closed. In any case, contamination of the municipal storage by birds was also considered likely. The retrospective explanation for what happened was that extreme cold on the evening of 9 November was believed to have caused a thermal inversion in the tank(s) leading to mixing of contaminated sediments with water that normally short-circuited through the tanks. This mixing introduced off-flavours which triggered the consumer complaints leading to the massive system flushing. Apparently, the flushing succeeded only in further mixing more contaminated sediments into the distributed flow and exposing consumers to the faecal pathogens. Taste and odour problems had occurred in this system from time to time in the past, but they were usually resolved by limited flushing of the system. The complaints in this incident apparently triggered a massive flushing response that was ultimately blamed for causing this severe outbreak.
In other outbreak cases, visual sensory warnings (turbidity or colour) have signalled contamination, but the outbreak reports did not explicitly mention concerns about taste and odours. Pittsfield, Massachusetts experienced an outbreak with 703 laboratoryconfirmed cases of giardiasis and an estimated 3,800 total cases over the period from November 1985 to January 1986. This system used chlorination without filtration. A reservoir, which had not been used for three years, was brought online as a temporary measure during construction of a filtration plant. Over a week after bringing this reservoir online, the flow was substantially increased, triggering consumer complaints about turbidity that was attributed to flow reversal in pipes that dislodged deposits in the distribution system. Illness began to emerge in the community within days, peaking two weeks after the increase in flow. The outbreak investigation revealed that these circumstances were compounded by process difficulties causing inadequate chlorination over the entire month of November.
A more serious outbreak triggering aesthetic responses occurred in March 1996 in a village of 1,100 in Fife, Scotland with over 700 ill with gastroenteritis caused by Campylobacter and E. coli O157:H7 (Jones and Roworth, 1996) . Two children developed haemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS) but there were no deaths. Villagers began complaining about discoloured water at the same time as local physicians noted an increase in patient visits with gastroenteritis. The subsequent investigation discovered that a vegetable processing plant had cross-contaminated the village water supply with untreated and sewagecontaminated stream water. The contaminated stream water had faecal coliforms from 14,100 to 17,600/100 mL and was estimated to have comprised approximately 10% of the village water supply because of the cross-connection. In this case, it seems unusual that water discolouration was the only aesthetic problem noted by consumers, but no complaints of taste or odour were explicitly described.
Finally, two outbreaks had clear sensory warnings of contamination. The first, an outbreak causing several thousand cases of gastroenteritis in Naas, Ireland, a town of over 11,000, was clearly identified by a single odour complaint of foul-smelling water on 7 October 1991, which triggered sampling for bacteriological analysis (Fogarty et al., 1995) . Further complaints on 8 October led to an inspection of the well supplying the community, which revealed visual evidence of sewage contamination, leading to the use of trucked water to replace the contaminated water supply. The subsequent epidemiological investigation revealed that illness began in the community on 5 October and one respondent recalled detecting odour that day. By the time that the alternative supply was implemented the epidemic had already peaked. Investigations revealed that raw sewage had leaked from a nearby sewer and a sample of the contaminated water showed 15 million E. coli per 100 mL, a massive level of contamination. The most surprising thing about this outbreak is that there were not more taste and odour complaints received by the water authority, given the massive sewage contamination that occurred. The experience from this outbreak, taken together with the other reports above, suggests that most consumers apparently do not complain. However, when signals of consistent complaints are detected, a water authority must take them very seriously.
The largest disease outbreak in an affluent country over the past 30 years occurred in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, with a metropolitan population served by the water utility of approximately 1.6 million. An outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in March and April 1993 was estimated to have caused over 400,000 cases of illness, including 4,400 hospitalisations (MacKenzie et al., 1994; Corso et al., 2003) . Over the two years following this massive outbreak as many as 50 extra deaths were estimated to have occurred among immune-compromised individuals, mainly AIDS patients (Hoxie et al., 1997) . Most of the early reports about this outbreak speculated about cattle wastes contaminating rivers flowing into Milwaukee harbour, slaughterhouse wastes and/or human sewage (MacKenzie et al., 1994) . Subsequently, advances in molecular biology allowed the Centres for Disease Control to establish that archived specimens of Cryptosporidium parvum from victims of this outbreak were of genotype 1, the human rather than bovine strain that is now called Cryptosporidium hominis, a fact that clearly implicates the sewage source over the cattle sources (Sulaiman et al., 1998) . Mixing studies in Milwaukee harbour implicated the Jones Island sewage treatment plant as the most likely source of contamination of the water treatment plant intake (Christensen et al., 1997) . Finally, Milwaukee had been the scene of at least three earlier drinking water outbreaks caused by sewage contaminated water drawn from Milwaukee harbour in 1916 , 1936 and 1938 (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004 .
There are obviously many interesting aspects about the Milwaukee outbreak with more than 28 peer-reviewed articles having been published (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004) . However, for this discussion, the most interesting feature concerns the warning that was available to signal the contamination and allow remedial action. Milwaukee was running two water treatment plants at the time of the outbreak, the Howard Avenue Plant (south plant) and the Linwood Plant (north plant). This feature allowed the outbreak to be detected because a survey of nursing homes served exclusively by one plant or the other demonstrated a distinctive peak in diarrhoea among residents in nursing homes served by the south plant. The south plant experienced substantial turbidity spikes in late March and early April, with the largest spike preceding the peak of diarrhoea cases by slightly more than a week (Proctor et al., 1998) . In both cases, no peaks were evident for the north plant. The key feature for our discussion is that consumer complaints also showed a sharp peak coincident with the turbidity spike.
The spike in consumer complaints is noteworthy because, although the turbidity spike was very distinct in terms of turbidity values (NTU), the maximum turbidity peak was less than 2 NTU, well below the regulatory requirement of 5 NTU that Milwaukee was operating under. Turbidity at these levels would not be visually detectable by consumers, meaning that the sharp spike in complaints was attributable to another cause, such as odour. That cause was not described by Proctor et al. (1998) . These data provide a compelling argument that water utilities must be extremely responsive to any unusual pattern in consumer complaints in addition to paying close attention to any unusual process monitoring results.
Off-flavours impairing disinfection
A sad irony among some of these outbreak case studies is that the off-flavour imparted by chlorination, the treatment that could have prevented many of these outbreaks, was a contributing factor to the inadequate chlorination. In Bramham, Yorkshire, in July 1980 an outbreak affecting about 3,000 of the 12,000 residents was caused by chlorination failure combined with sewage contamination of the groundwater source (Short, 1988) . Because the wells were located within the community and there was no treated water storage, consumers complained about the chlorinous taste of the freshly chlorinated water. This situation encouraged the operators to keep the chlorine residual as low as possible, typically providing chlorine residuals less than 0.01 mg/L at a point 100 m downstream of the chlorinator. When treated water monitoring revealed bacterial contamination, chlorination was increased, but faulty equipment resulted in the failure to deliver the chlorine solution to the water being treated and the outbreak ensued.
In Walkerton, the failure to monitor chlorine residuals was a critical factor in allowing the outbreak to reach the severity that occurred because nine days passed between the first opportunity to detect the contamination and the issuance of a boil water advisory that reduced the likelihood of exposure (Hrudey and Walker, 2005) . When victims began seeking medical attention for diarrhoea about six days after the contamination occurred, they or their care-givers were advised to provide the ill with ample fluids to prevent dehydration, a response that increased the exposure of the patients. The operators testified at the Walkerton Inquiry that consumers often complained about the taste of chlorine (O'Connor, 2002a) . Furthermore, the operators often consumed the raw water before chlorination for the same reasons. Because they had no apparent concept of the serious health risk posed by failing to disinfect the water, they were delinquent about maintaining adequate chlorination and ignored the need to measure chlorine residual, a responsibility that could have substantially reduced if not prevented the outbreak (Hrudey and Walker, 2005) .
A review of waterborne outbreaks in Finland also referred to one unspecified community outbreak in which concerns about formation of chlorinated organic compounds were cited as the reason for lowering chlorination to ineffective levels, leading to an outbreak affecting a few hundred people (Lahti and Hiisvirta, 1995) . Several other Finnish outbreaks were attributed to the use of unchlorinated drinking water (Kukkula et al., 1999) . Finally, an extreme example of aversion to chlorine disinfection occurred in Creston and Erickson, BC, where outbreaks of giardiasis were attributed to the use of untreated surface water from a mountain stream in 1985 and again in 1990 (Isaac-Renton et al., 1994 . After the second outbreak the local Medical Officer of Health (MOH) ordered implementation of chlorination, but the people of Erickson resisted throughout the 1990s. When the MOH obtained a court order to take over the authority responsible for the water supply, 200 local residents blockaded the road for 55 days to prevent installation of the chlorinator. This controversy continued after the Walkerton outbreak grabbed enormous media attention across Canada.
Conclusions
Waterborne disease outbreaks continue to occur in affluent nations that are fully capable of preventing such occurrences, particularly if the sensible preventive risk management approaches advocated in recent drinking water guidelines for Australia (NHMRC, 2004) and the World Health Organization (WHO, 2004) are followed. In the majority of the case studies reviewed over the past 30 years, sensory warnings of contamination were not evident. In some extreme cases, even gross contamination of drinking water failed to trigger consumer complaints. However, in a smaller number of cases, aesthetic factors detectable by consumers, including off-flavours, provided warnings that could have been pursued to reduce substantially the impact of the outbreaks. These findings reinforce the merits of the arguments made by McGuire that water utilities must pay close attention to the aesthetic quality of the water they produce (McGuire, 1995) . This must be a high priority, not an afterthought ranked well below regulatory compliance.
